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The Constitution of the Environmental Emergency, by Jocelyn Stacey 
Abstract 
Jocelyn Stacey’s The Constitution of the Environmental Emergency is a unique text in the area of 
environmental law. It argues for reframing environmental law from the premise that environmental issues 
confront lawmakers as emergencies that are impossible to reliably predict. Stacey relies on a constructive 
tension between two somewhat overlapping theories of legitimate government action: common law 
constitutionalism and deliberative democracy. When Stacey argues that environmental issues constitute 
emergencies, she shows how lawmakers are confronted with problems that entail “deep uncertainty 
where the possibility of a catastrophe cannot be reliably eliminated in advance.” This approach allows her 
to draw on insights from scholarship on emergencies and the rule of law to reimagine the purpose and 
orientation of environmental law, namely the centrality of having government institutions publicly justify 
important decisions. 
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Jocelyn Stacey’s The Constitution of the Environmental Emergency is a unique text in the area 
of environmental law. It argues for reframing environmental law from the premise that 
environmental issues confront lawmakers as emergencies that are impossible to reliably 
predict. Stacey relies on a constructive tension between two somewhat overlapping theories 
of legitimate government action: common law constitutionalism and deliberative democracy. 
When Stacey argues that environmental issues constitute emergencies, she shows how 
lawmakers are confronted with problems that entail “deep uncertainty where the possibility 
of a catastrophe cannot be reliably eliminated in advance.” This approach allows her to draw 
on insights from scholarship on emergencies and the rule of law to reimagine the purpose 
and orientation of environmental law, namely the centrality of having government institutions 
publicly justify important decisions. 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY is a unique text in the 
area of environmental law. Te frst book written by Jocelyn Stacey, Assistant 
Professor at the Peter A. Allard School of Law at the University of British 
Columbia, it argues for reframing environmental law from the premise that 
environmental issues confront lawmakers as emergencies that are impossible to 
reliably predict. Te book is an elaboration of Stacey’s doctoral studies at the 
McGill Faculty of Law and builds on arguments put forward in the Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal and the Review of Constitutional Studies.3 
1. (Hart Publishing, 2018) [Stacey, Constitution of the Environmental Emergency]. 
2. JD Candidate 2020, Osgoode Hall Law School. 
3. Jocelyn Stacey, “Te Environmental Emergency and the Legality of Discretion in 
Environmental Law” (2015) 52 Osgoode Hall LJ 985 [Stacey, “Legality of Discretion”]; 
Jocelyn Stacey, “Te Environmental, Democratic, and Rule-of-Law Implications of Harper’s 
Environmental Assessment Legacy” (2016) 21 Rev Const Stud 165. 









As hundreds of municipal and regional governments across Canada 
and the globe—mostly in common law jurisdictions—issue declarations of 
climate emergency,4 critical scholarship on the ways in which environmental 
management and law challenge some of our fundamental assumptions about 
the rule of law is increasingly relevant. When Stacey argues that environmental 
issues constitute emergencies, she shows how lawmakers are confronted with 
problems that entail “deep uncertainty where the possibility of a catastrophe 
cannot be reliably eliminated in advance.”5 Tis approach allows her to draw on 
insights from scholarship on emergencies and the rule of law to reimagine the 
purpose and orientation of environmental law, namely the centrality of having 
government institutions publicly justify important decisions. Stacey anticipates 
the critique that environmental issues are not typically met with the overzealous 
state action that characterizes conventional emergencies, such as those found 
in counter-terrorism measures, by focusing on the nature of the fundamental 
challenge in law that these issues present and not the state response to them.6 
Stacey relies on a constructive tension between two somewhat overlapping 
theories of legitimate government action: common law constitutionalism and 
deliberative democracy. Te former posits that “public ofcials must justify 
their decisions on the basis of core common law constitutional principles, such 
as reasonableness and fairness” and allows judicial intervention when they do 
not, while the latter emphasizes that “collective rule is legitimate when public 
decisions are justifed by general, public-regarding reasons that those afected 
can reasonably accept.”7 Te confuence of these two theories constitutes Stacey’s 
public-justifcation theory of the rule of law, which she contrasts with the formal 
conception of the rule of law wherein distinct powers are separated between 
institutions of government. 
Tis book is made up of two parts, with a total of eight chapters. In part 
one, entitled “Te Environmental Emergency,” the frst chapter introduces the 
controversial Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmitt’s challenge to fnd a system of law 
that can govern emergencies, and argues that the complexity and unpredictability 
of human interaction with the environment fulfll the constitutive features of 
emergencies. Tese constitutive features, as Stacey says, are “an inability to know 
4. “Te Exponential Growth of Local Climate Emergency Declarations” (26 March 
2019), online (blog): Te Climate Mobilization <www.theclimatemobilization.org/blog/ 
the-exponential-growth-of-local-climate-emergency-declarations> [perma.cc/CT3S-HGUD]. 
5. Stacey, Constitution of the Environmental Emergency, supra note 1 at 1. 
6. Ibid at 6-7. 
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in advance which issues contain the possibility of a catastrophe and an inability 
to know in advance what to do in response to such an unforeseen event.”8 Te 
second chapter is a critique of the environmental reform position that dominates 
Canadian environmental law. Stacey characterizes the position as grounded in 
a formal conception of the rule of law whereby a façade of legality does not 
meaningfully constrain the exercise of administrative decisions and creates 
“legal black and grey holes” throughout environmental law. Te third chapter 
turns its attention to environmental governance instead of law, wherein the 
complexity of environmental problems is addressed at the expense of attention 
to the rule of law, ignoring in particular the respect of individual participation 
in democratic systems of governance. Tese three chapters make up the bulk of 
Stacey’s critique of the existing literature. Her approach avoids the more common 
contemporary debates such as provincial-federal responsibilities and the role of 
Indigenous rights9 and instead focuses on the fundamental assumptions about 
where decision-making authority comes from. 
Part two, entitled “Responding to the Environmental Emergency,” begins 
with chapter four, which ofers a rule of law theory that responds democratically 
to the environmental emergency idea from chapter one. Chapter four draws on 
Canadian administrative law jurisprudence requiring ofcials to publicly justify 
their exercises of authority based on common law principles such as fairness 
and reasonableness. Public justifcation through common law principles form 
the basis of legitimate governance that answers Schmitt’s challenge to manage 
disasters through a system of law that both empowers and constrains public 
authority. Te ffth chapter is the frst of three chapters that use specifc case 
studies of environmental governance challenges to outline the components of 
the public-justifcation rule of law theory. Te chapter shows how the hybridity 
of the British Columbia Forest Practices Board has responded to a range of 
environmental challenges with creative institutional design that helps it justify 
its decisions to the public. Te sixth chapter examines the institutional failure of 
the National Energy Board and its crisis of legitimacy arising from the fact that 
it operates within one of Stacey’s “legal grey holes” under the formal conception 
of the rule of law described in chapter two. Stacey argues that the common law 
principles of reasonableness and fairness can be informed by key environmental 
principles—precaution and sustainable development—to re-imagine processes 
and decisions from the National Energy Board that are publicly justifed on a 
8. Ibid at 9. 
9. See e.g. Stepan Wood, Georgia Tanner & Benjamin J Richardson, “What Ever Happened to 
Canadian Environmental Law?” (2010) 37 Ecology LQ 981. 









democratic basis. Te seventh chapter narrows in on the reasonableness principle 
in the complex and contested context of industrial wind turbine development in 
Ontario. Te chapter explores the robust Ontario Environmental Review Tribunal 
jurisprudence on the potential harms that wind turbines pose to human and 
environmental health and argues that the Tribunal has implicitly operationalized 
the public-justifcation theory of the rule of law. Stacey suggests that the Tribunal 
would beneft from relying on public-justifcation theory more explicitly in order 
to resist the apparent “plain meaning” of its governance statute, “which threatens 
individual agency by purporting to preclude the operation of the precautionary 
principle.”10 In the fnal chapter, Stacey develops the public-justifcation 
conception of the rule of law to engage with David R. Boyd’s leading academic 
proposal for a Charter right to a healthy environment.11 She argues that Boyd has 
“failed to sufciently attend to the practice and method of rights adjudication 
in Canada” within environmental claims made under section 7 of the Charter, 
ofering the public-justifcation theory as a theoretically defensible and practically 
realizable foundation for adjudicating environmental rights.12 
Stacey’s book presents a detailed and compelling case for reconceptualizing 
environmental law as she envisions it. Te book’s normative vision is perhaps 
most compelling in its roadmap for rethinking the National Energy Board, 
an institution that has sustained several high-profle rebukes by the courts13 and 
sufers from a crisis of legitimacy.14 Whereas most scholarship on National Energy 
Board reform relies on reforming institutional practices or shifting its mandate 
and underlying government energy policy priorities, Stacey’s argument provides a 
realistic roadmap for National Energy Board reform that could accommodate the 
10. Stacey, Constitution of the Environmental Emergency, supra note 1 at 11. 
11. See Te Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada’s Constitution 
(UBC Press, 2012). 
12. Stacey, Constitution of the Environmental Emergency, supra note 1 at 209. 
13. See Stacey, Constitution of the Environmental Emergency, supra note 1 at 139-42 (for a detailed 
discussion of the National Energy Board’s pipeline problems). See also Tsleil-Waututh Nation 
v Canada (AG), 2017 FCA 128. 
14. See Stacey, Constitution of the Environmental Emergency, supra note 1 at 148; Jonathan 
Montpetit, “National Energy Board fghts to Restore Legitimacy at Quebec Hearings” (28 
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various competing priorities of Canadian elected ofcials.15 Stacey argues that the 
National Energy Board should publicly justify its decisions through the lenses of 
environmental law principles like sustainable development and the precautionary 
principle. She further argues that it should use a process that combines public 
deliberation and scientifc expertise that “would provide the public with the 
information it needs to hold the ultimate decision maker democratically 
accountable.”16 In doing so, Stacey “elaborates a theory of environmental law that 
does not conclusively reject a series of major pipeline proposals that are nothing 
but bad news for the environment” and instead ofers “a set of questions that 
the NEB must answer in order to comply with the rule of law.”17 Tis approach 
does not sidestep the various other pressing debates and challenges the National 
Energy Board and environmental law in general face, rather, it provides a general 
principled framework that could reorient a debate that has seen few signs of 
resolution. Stacey’s best examples of what this might look like in practice are from 
Canada’s frst environmental review of a pipeline and Ontario’s reform eforts to 
protect drinking water sources after the Walkerton crisis. Tese examples bolster 
her opening argument that environmental issues are confronted as disasters.18 
An early version of Stacey’s argument about the environmental emergency 
was met with criticism by Bruce Pardy, who argued that giving unfettered control 
over environmental management to the executive under the guise of emergency 
powers is incompatible with the rule of law.19 While not accurately representing 
Stacey’s arguments, Pardy does put forward some important challenges to 
her thesis, namely that emergency powers in Canadian law are derived from 
the common law Crown prerogative and several federal statutes and that this 
executive power is reviewable by the courts. In her book, Stacey incorporates 
Pardy’s critique and successfully uses it to strengthen her argument. She shows 
how the rationale by which courts review emergency powers is constitutive of the 
15. See e.g. Geofrey H Salomons & George Hoberg, “Setting Boundaries of Participation in 
Environmental Impact Assessment” (2014) 45 Envtl Impact Assessment Rev 69; Karena 
Shaw et al, “Conficted or Constructive? Exploring Community Responses to New Energy 
Developments in Canada” (2015) 8 Energy Research & Soc Science 41; Dwight Newman, 
“Te Rule and Role of Law: Te Duty to Consult, Aboriginal Communities, and the 
Canadian Resource Sector” (May 2014), online (pdf ): Macdonald-Laurier Institute <www. 
macdonaldlaurier.ca/fles/pdf/DutyToConsult-Final.pdf> [perma.cc/AP4K-MDGU]. 
16. Stacey, Constitution of the Environmental Emergency, supra note 1 at 181. 
17. Ibid at 183. 
18. See ibid at 167. 
19. See Stacey, “Legality of Discretion,” supra note 3; Bruce Pardy, “Te Unbearable Licence of 
Being the Executive: A Response to Stacey’s Permanent Environmental Emergency” (2015) 
52 Osgoode Hall LJ 1029. 





response to Schmitt’s challenge to govern emergencies through law. However, that 
Stacey’s base argument that environmental issues act like emergencies because 
they are complex and unpredictable would beneft from elaboration remains a 
pertinent critique. As Pardy notes:20 
If your mandate is to manage ecosystems and they cannot be managed, that will seem 
like an emergency. Te nature of ecosystems is incompatible with the aspirations of 
those who wish to manage them, but it is not incompatible with the requirements 
of the rule of law. Te management imperative does not arise from variability and 
unpredictability in ecosystems but from the culture of the administrative state, 
which exists to manage, facilitate, and control the attributes of modern civilization. 
Tis critique also begs the question of why emergencies are framed as 
ongoing when Canada’s most important emergency legislation treats emergencies 
as inherently temporary and does not allow for a perpetual state of emergency 
governance.21 Tese challenges show that the book provokes discussion because 
it provides a controversial way of looking at environmental law problems. Te 
fact that it leaves some questions unanswered is inevitable given its ambitious 
thesis, the risk Stacey has taken in putting forward a novel thesis should 
pay of by challenging conventional thought among environmental and 
administrative law scholars. 
20. Pardy, supra note 19 at 1036. 
21. Emergencies Act, RSC 1985, c 22 (4th Supp), s 3. 
